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FUTURE INTERESTS IN INDIANA'
BERNARD

C. GAVIT*

INTRODUCTION
Because it seems impossible to select a concise title that will
do so, it seems desirable to properly limit the scope of this article
by a short introduction. The author started out several years
ago to attempt to discover what the Indiana courts had said
about the Rule against Perpetuities, and how those courts had
interpreted Section 40, Chap. 23, 1 R. S. 1852, p. 238,' and
Sections 1-3, Chap. 9, 2 R. S. 1852, p. 245.2 I have gone through
the Indiana reports volume by volume, and have digested every
case which decides or suggests any question in the field of the
law of Future Interests. There are one hundred such cases in
the Appellate Court reports, and one hundred and ninety-five
in the Supreme Court reports.
Although the search was originally rather limited in its purpose a great many cases were discovered not bearing on the subject of the Rule against Perpetuities and the closely related
subject of Restraints on Alienation, but which were interesting,
to say the least, and which did discuss and decide questions in
the field of Future Interests.
The great mass of the decisions on the subject contain much
that is devoted to the question of the proper interpretation of
the instrument supposed to create a future interest. It is sometimes difficult to determine where the questions of presumptions
' Professor Lewis M. Simes of the College of Law, Ohio State University,
very kindly read the manuscript of this article and submitted several criticisms which have been taken advantage of, and the author desires to
acknowledge his indebtedness to Mr. Simes for his assistance.
'::See biographical note, p. 544.
1 Sec. 13416, Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926.
2 Sec. 12171-3, Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926.
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and rules of interpretation leave off and questions of the substantive law of Future Interests begin. Partly in view of that
difficulty and partly in view of the interest to the profession of
at least a collection of all the cases in all of their aspects it has
seemed proper to include in this paper almost everything contained in the reports. This leads to a rather incoherent arrangement at times, but it has seemed worth while to give at least a
compilation of the Indiana authorities on every phase of the
subject which they touch. No discussion or criticism is attempted
in parts of the paper because time and space do not permit.
There are a great many problems in connection with the general subject which have not been decided or discussed by the
Indiana Courts. The paper is limited in the main to those problems in Future Interests which have actually found their way
into the appellate courts of Indiana, or which are suggested by
decisions actually made.
It is perhaps well to state at the beginning that the material
is really very scanty. Although Indiana has perhaps had its
share of litigation over wills and their proper and improper
interpretations, few of the wills which have found their way
to the appellate courts have presented any very complicated
questions. Practically all of the important cases are comparatively recent, and it is obvious that as the wealth of the state
increases and is disposed of by will the law of Future Interests
will assume a growing importance.
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES AND RESTRAINTS
ON ALIENATION
Section 40, Chap. 23, 1 R. S. 1852, p. 238,3 provides as follows:
"SUSPENSION

OF POWER OF ALIENATION PROHIBITED-

Exception. The absolute power of aliening lands shall not be suspended
by any limitation or condition whatever, contained in any grant, conveyance or devise, for a longer period than during the existence of a life or any
number of lives in being at the creation of the estate conveyed, granted, devised and therein specified, with the exception that a contingent remainder

in fee may be created on a prior remainder in fee, to take effect in the
event that the person or persons to whom the first remainder is limited
shall die under the age of twenty-one years, or upon any other contingency

by which the estate of such person or persons may be determined before
they attain their full age."

It is to be noted that this section deals only with land.
3 Sec. 13416 Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926.

FUTURE INTERESTS
Sections 1-3, Chap. 9, 2 R. S. 1852, p. 245,4 provide as follows:
"HOW LONG OWNERSHIP MAY BE SUSPENDED.-1. No limitation or condition shall suspend the absolute ownership of personal property
longer than till the termination of lives in being at the time of the execution of the instrument containing such limitation or condition, or, if in a
will, of lives in being at the death of the testator."
"HOW LONG ACCUMULATIONS MAY RUN-2. A provision for
the accumulation of interest or income of money or other personal property
by any conveyance or will shall be void, except as follows:
First. If the accumulation be directed to commence at any period subsequent to the death of the person executing such instrument, it may be
within the time allowed in the first section of this act for the suspension
of ownership, and at some time during the minority of the persons for
whose benefit it is intended, and must terminate at the expiration of their
minority. But a provision for accumulation beyond the minority of such
persons shall be void only as respects the time beyond such minority."

It is to be noted that these sections apply only to personal
property.
The language of the two statutes is materially different; but
there is no case in Indiana which discusses the effect of the
difference in the language employed. Apparently it has been
assumed that the two statutes were to all intents and purposes
the same.5 And as will be seen in the discussion of the cases
hereafter the courts have in practically all of the cases assumed
that both statutes are codifications of the principle of the Com-

mon Law Rule against Perpetuities.

In none of the decided

cases in Indiana is there any discussion of the obvious problem
as to whether or not the Statutes are directed solely against
Restraints on Alienation and do not alter the Common Law Rule

against Perpetuities.
Like a good portion of the balance of the Revised Statutes of
1852, the sections quoted above were copied in part from the
New York Statute on the subject. The New York Statute provides that every future estate shall be void in its creation which
shall suspend the absolute power of alienation for a longer
period than during the continuance of two lives in being at the

creation of the estate, and that such suspension occurs when
there are no persons in being by whom an absolute fee in

possession can be conveyed. 6

Michigan has an identical stat-

ute.7 The New York Statute has been construed as being directed against remoteness of vesting as well as restraints on
Sec. 12171-3 Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926.
GSee I:uxford v. Milligan, 50 Ind. 542 (1874).
6 1 Rev. St. N. Y. pt. 2, C. I., tit. 2, Sec. 14, 15.
7 Mich. Comp. Laws 1915, Sec. 11532, 11533.
4
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alienation. 8 The Michigan Statute has been construed as merely
a rule against inalienability and not against remoteness of
vesting, so that the Common Law Rule against Perpetuities is
still law in Michigan.9
The Common Law Rule against Perpetuities declared invalid
any estate dependent on any limitation or condition, the purpose
or possible effect of which was to allow the estate to vest in the
future more than twenty-one years after a life or lives in
being.' 0 Any number of lives in being were permitted whether
they were interested in the estate or not, so long as they were
ascertainable.", It is of course possible to have an estate which
may not vest within the time allowed, where the property will
be alienable by all parties joining in a conveyance; still the
remote estate was invalid under the rule, it being a rule directed
against the remote vesting of estates, and not against unreasonable restraints on alienation or the use of property.' 2 In a
limited sense in some cases the remote vesting of an estate has
a restraining influence on alienation; that is, there may be a
limitation to unborn children at twenty-one, or some such similar limitation, where persons are not in being who can convey.
That, however, is true of any limitation or contingency going
to the question as to who is to take (otherwise than as between
specified living persons). The restraint is incidental to the contingency, and is not imposed as a restraint upon the devisee's
or grantee's power to use or convey the property.
While the Indiana Statutes apparently permit even an absolute
restraint on alienation which is properly limited in time, the
Common Law prohibited every restraint on alienation except it
3
be trivial, or supported by public policy.'
8 In re Wilcox, 194 N. Y. 288, 87 N. E. 497 (1909) ; in re Perkins Estate,
245 N. Y. 478, 157 N. E. 750 (1927).
9 Windiate v. Lorman, 211 N. W. 62 (Mich. 1926); Fitzgerald v. City,
123 Mich. 281, 82 N. W. 56 (1900); 40 H. L. R. 913 (April 1927); Michigan
Mich. , 196 N. W. 976 (1924).
Trust Co. v. Baker, 10 1. Tiff. Real Prop. 2d Ed. Vol. 1, p. 591; Cadell v. Palmer, H. of L.
1833, 1 Cl. & F. 372. There is some present day dissent from the Rule as
thus stated. See, for example, 6 Minn. Law Review, 650.
11 Thellusson v. Woodford, H. of L. 1805, 11 Ves. 112.
12 Tiff. Real Prop. 2d Ed., Vol. 1, p. 597; Gray, Perpetuities, Sec. 123-

200.

1. Tiff. Real Prop. 2d Ed., Vol. III, pp. 1279-1328; Lan gdon v. Ingram,
28 Ind. 360 (1867); Allen v. Craft, 109 Ind. 476 (1886). What was construed to be a partial restraint, (in the nature of a restraint on alienation
by partition) has been held valid under the statute. Halstead v. Coen, 31

FUTURE INTERESTS

.The Indiana cases on the Rule against Perpetuities, and construing the statutes in question, are very few, so that it is possible, and it seems best, to discuss them each in detail.
There is but one Indiana case on the subject construing an
instrument which took effect prior to 1852. That is the case of
S'tephens v. Evans.14 In that case the testator died in 1843 and
devised certain real estate to trustees "to the use of S for life and
W for life, and to the children of S now living, and hereafter
born, as tenants in common in fee simple upon attaining the
age of twenty-one, and if any child die intestate and without
lawful issue alive, then his share to the cousins of such deceased
child and their descendants, the descendants of any deceased
cousin taking the share to which their deceased parent would
have been entitled if living." The court in that case held that
the devise to the cousins was void under the Rule against Perpetuities. The court states the rule as follows :'- "The rule is,
that a limitation over by way of executory devise, in order to
be valid, must be so made that the estate not only may, but must
vest in possession within a life or lives in being and twenty-one
years and nine months at the farthest, and if by any possibility,
the vesting may be postponed beyond this period, the limitation
will be void; and the period from which the rule runs, is the
death of the testator." The court is incorrect in saying that
the estate must vest "in possession" within the time allowed. It
was only necessary that the limitation or contingency must be
determined within the time allowed, so that the estate vested. 1
The result of the case is certainly correct. The children of
S and W had to be born during lives in being at the death of T,
but the estate of the cousins might vest more than twenty-one
years after the birth of a child, and the death of S and W. The
case is significant in this, all of the children of S and W died
during the lifetime of W, so that as events actually occurred the
devise to the cousins did vest (if valid) during lives in being.
But as the court points out, the rule declares invalid every devise which may not vest within the time allowed.
Ind. App. 302 (1903). But see, Sec. 1265, Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926, apparently permitting just such a restraint.
'430 Ind. 39 (1868). In the subsequent case of Schoni v. Stephens,
62 Ind. 441 (1878) involving the same will the court adheres to the decision
in this case.
15 At p. 51.
16 Tiff. Real Prop. 2d Ed., Vol. 1, p. 593.
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The next case in order is that of Huxford v. Milligan." This
case was decided under the Revised Statutes of 1852. T devised
'to C and B and should either die without issue, then their share
to go back to my estate, to be divided equally among my children
then living.' B and C both died without issue, but the court held
that the will meant an indefinite failure of issue, giving the
devisees a fee tail at common law, which became a fee simple
8
under the Indiana Statute.
But the court went on to say that being an indefinite failure
of issue, the limitation over was void as being too remote,'19 and
as being in violation of the statute against perpetuities. 20 Almost without exception the Indiana courts have referred to this
statute as being the "Statute against Perpetuities," and it is
clear from the opinion in the case under discussion that the court
understood the statute to be a declaration of the principle of
the Common Law rule against remoteness of vesting. There
was certainly no "absolute suspension of the power of aliening
lands," within the ordinary meaning of those words. The executory devise was "to my children then living," so that living
persons could have joined in a conveyance which would have
conveyed a fee. From the most technical point of view there
was no suspension of the power of alienation.
This case discusses the applicability of the second portion of
the real property Statute against Perpetuities. The first half
of the section prohibits the absolute suspension of the power of
conveying lands for a longer period than lives in being, and the
second half says this: "with the exception that a contingent
remainder in fee may be limited on a prior remainder in fee to
take effect in the event that the person or persons to whom the
first remainder is limited shall die under the age of twenty-one
(21) years or upon any other contingency by which the estate
of such person or persons may be determined before they attain
their full age." This latter portion of the statute is not a part
of the statute dealing with personal property. The inclusion of
this latter portion of the statute lends some weight to the repeated reference by the courts to the staute as a "statute against
17 50 Ind. 542 (1874).
Is See 13412, Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926.

And this despite the fact

that the executory devise over was to persons necessarily in being. In the
later case of Cain v. Robertson, 27 Ind. App. 198 (1901) a somewhat
similar will was construed to mean a definite failure of issue.
10 At p. 546.
20
21

At p. 549, citing Sec. 40, Chap. 23, I. R. S.1852.
Outland v. Bowen, 115 Ind. 150 (1888).
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perpetuities," although the first portion of the statute, as will
be seen hereafter, has been given full force and effect as regards
the suspension of the power of alienation.
At Common Law, of course, there could not be a contingent
remainder in fee upon a prior remainder in fee. Indeed, as is
pointed out in the case under discussion, 22 "No remainder can
be limited after the grant of an estate in fee simple." It was
argued by counsel for the appellees in the case under discussion
that the latter portion of the statute made the supposed remainder in that case valid, but the court dismissed the argument with a quotation of the statute saying that the rule had
no application in this case; that is, it was not limited to take
effect in the event that the person or persons to whom the first
remainder was limited should die under twenty-one (21) years
of age.
There is but one subsequent case discussing the meaning of the
23
second portion of the statute.
The court dismisses the question as to the personal property
feature of the case by saying that "it is clear that if the limitation over of the real estate is void, the attempt to dispose of the
personal estate in that manner is also void."
As pointed out above, the court held that the limitation over,
being upon an indefinite failure of issue, was in violation of the
"Statute against Perpetuities" and, therefore, void. That is,
the statute was given effect in this case as a statute against the
remote vesting of estates.
There is no discussion by the court of the first portion of the
statute. The fact is that the case is decided upon the wrong
theory, although a correct result is reached. Obviously the
phrase "die without issue" referred to a death during the life of
the testator under the commonly accepted interpretation of wills
of this character, and the sons having survived the testator, took
24
a fee simple.
The next case decided by the Supreme Court under the statute
is the famous case of Fowler v. Duhme.25 In this case there
was a devise of real estate to certain children, no real estate in
a certain county to be sold by them for twenty-five (25) years.
The court held that the restraint against alienation for twentyfive (25) years was invalid under the statute, being measured in
22 At p. 549.
Brandon, 78 Ind. App. 450 (1922).
24 See, Fowler v. Duhme, 143 Ind. 248 (1895).
25 143 Ind. 248 (1895).
23 Finney ".
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years and not by lives in being. The court states that the weight
of authority is against the validity of restraints on alienation,
however limited in time, upon the theory that at Common Law
the restraint is void for repugnancy. 26 The intimation of the
court in the case is, however, that an absolute restraint measured
by lives in being would be valid under the statute. In this case
there was no remote vesting of estates in question, but merely
an absolute restraint on alienation, invalid at Common Law, and
held to be invalid under the "Statute against Perpetuities."
The next case decided by the Supreme Court is that of Murphey v. Brown.27 In this case the testator had made a will where
various interests were conditioned upon the happening of certain events at a specified time. He survived that time and certain residuary legatees, who would admittedly have had an
executory interest had the testator died on the date of the will,
were held to have a vested interest on the death of the testator,
all the conditions having been satisfied prior to the actual death
of the testator. In this case the court again talks about the
"Statute against Perpetuities," but does not cite the statute.
The opinion contains this language, which certainly is good law:
"A will may be in violation of a statute against perpetuities
when executed, and be void for that reason, but events may
happen before the death of the testator that will remove all such
objectionable features."
The last case decided by the Supreme Court is that of Quilliam
v. Union Trust Company.23 In that case the testator gave real
and personal property to D, for life, then to her children and
grandchildren for life, provided real estate was not to be sold
for fifty years, and if D died without issue, then the income for
fifty years to N, with a direction for division at the end of fifty
years. D survived the testator, but died without issue, and N
claimed as against the heirs of D. The court held that the fifty
year restraint was void, and that D took a fee simple under the
doctrines announced in Huxford v. Milligan, supra. But the
court says this,2 9 "It would clearly be a limitation over upon an
indefinite failure of issue. In that event, it might not take effect
until after the period allowed by our statute." 30 The language
26 At p. 291.

27 159 Ind. 106 (1902).
28 194 Ind. 521 (1923).
29 At p. 535.

30 Citing Sec. 3998, Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1914, which is now Sec.
13416 Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926.
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used indicates that the court viewed the statute as being something more than a statute against restraints on alienation.
But the court also uses this language, 3' "It is admitted that
so much of the above will as attempts to suspend the power of
alienation of such real estate for the period of fifty years is void,
on account of the rule against perpetuities, and the statute prohibiting the suspension of the power of alienation. ' 32 The latter
language definitely indicates that the court thought that the rule
against perpetuities was something quite different from the
statute! The common law rule against perpetuities would have
no application (as far as D's estate was concerned), because the
estate given to D was a vested one, and the restraint would be
void because of repugnancy. But the language of the case is so
contradictory that it is impossible to tell what the court actually
thought upon the subject. The fact is that in this case the
statute was first applied as a statute against remoteness of vesting, and then as a statute against restraints on alienation!
The Appellate Court had no jurisdiction of this class of cases
until after the taking effect of Chapter 247, Acts 1901, p. 565.
Consequently there are no cases on the subject in the Appellate
Court reports until Phillips v. Heldt.: 3 In this case T gave his
property to his executor in trust to pay the income to certain
people and institutions for thirty years, and at the end of that
time to sell, and to divide according to directions. Except in
two instances where the income from specific property was given
to individuals for life the court held the entire scheme invalid
under the statutes in question.
The court says this, 34 "The effect of the creation of the trust to
continue for thirty years is a suspension of alienation for that
period and is invalid because it contravenes the statute of this
state against restraints on alienation, and the rule against perpetuities."3 5 And a little later the Court says this, "The suspension of the power of alienation in said will is not made to
depend upon a life or any number of lives in being, but is fixed
for a term of years. The suspension for a term of years, however short, is void. In the will before us there is no express
prohibition of alienation for any period, but that such alienation is forbidden is necessarily implied by the creation of a trust
At p. 528.
Citing the same statute, and Fowler v. Duhme, supra.
33 33 Ind. App. 388 (1904).
31

32

34 At

p. 395.

33 Citing the statutes in question and Fowler v. Duhme, supra.
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in the sixth item of the will, which is to continue for thirty
years, and the direction for the sale at the end of thirty years
by item twenty-two"-"The remaining items of the will constitute a general scheme to create a trust for thirty years and are
therefore invalid under the statute."
All of the estates for thirty years were vested estates.3 6 The
amazing result of the case is that under the Court's interpretation of the statute it is impossible in Indiana to create a vested
estate for years! As pointed out in the opinion there is no
actual restraint on alienation; the beneficiaries were free to sell
their estates for years. The fact that legal title was vested in a
trustee was immaterial. 37 The court clearly is confused in its
application of the statute to the case in question. The devise
over at the end of thirty years may or-may not have been invalid
under the Rule or Statute against Perpetuities, but that would
not effect prior vested estates. They were clearly separable from
the subsequent provisions of the will.
. The next case decided by the Appellate Court limits the doctrine of Phillips v. Heldt, for it is decided in the case of Matlockc
v. Lock, 38 that if the term for years must necessarily expire
within a life in being that then thereis no violation of the statute. In that case the testator gave to GD, she not to mortgage
or encumber until she reaches forty, and if she die before forty
then to her children. The court lays no emphasis on the fact
that in this case there was no suspension of the absolute power
of alienation, but only a very limited restraint, but says that
in view of the fact that GD had to attain the age of forty during
her own lifetime that there was no attempt made to suspend the
power of alienation beyond the life of anyone in being. The
same doctrine is followed in the case of Vaubel v. Lang.39
But the court again confuses the matter by this language :40
"As a test whether the provisions of the will are repugnant to
the statute against perpetuities, it is pertinent to inquire what
rights GD's children would have if she should, for a valuable
consideration, sell and convey, to a third party, all of the real
estate devised to her, and die before arriving at the age of forty
years, leaving such child or children. Under the authorities
cited, there is no question that they would be entitled to recover
36 Silvers v. Canary, 114 Ind. 129.'
37 Silvers v. Canary, 114 Ind. 129.

38 38 Ind. App. 281 (1906).
39 81 Ind. App. 96 (1923).
40 At p. 30 4 .
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the estate, if they should timely assert their rights." The court
again talks about the "Statute Against Perpetuities." The test
it suggests is not very valuable, because it presupposes the determination of the question as to what GD sold.
The next case, Reeder v. Antrim,41 holds invalid under the
statute an absolute restraint for ten years. But the court here
42
also talks about the "Statute against Perpetuities."
3
The next case is that of Finney v. Brandon.' In this case G
deeded to H and W, in fee, and a later clause provided that in
the event of the death or the remarriage of W after the death
of H, then the property to revert to the children of H. H dies
first leaving children, and W sues to quiet title against them.
The court held that W took a fee simple, the second clause in the
deed being void for repugnancy, but went on to say that the
provision for the children of H was a contingent remainder void
under the statute in question, although clearly the limitation
over must take effect during a life in being, and the estate over
was limited to persons in being.
The court says this, 44 "A contingent remainder must take
effect in the event that the person or persons to whom the first
remainder is limited shall die under the age of twenty-one, or
upon some other contingency by which the estate of the first
taker attains full age.-Such a contingent remainder (as here)
is void, since it is in derogation of the statute prohibiting (sic)
alienation." The court's idea here is that there can never be a
contingent remainder in fee except under the exception contained in the statute! The limitation over here was to take
effect during the life in being so that under a proper interpretation of the statute that portion of the deed was unoffending.
The real difficulty was that the limitation over, being a fee on a
fee in a deed could only take effect by the use of a trustee as an
executory interest.
A supposed contingent remainder in fee on a prior remainder
in fee would at common law be void for repugnancy, as a matter
of interpretation, and void as a physical impossibility as well.
And this being a deed and not a will, and there being no trust
created, the supposed executory interest would fail.45
The court seems to think, however, that the statute permits
4164 Ind. App. 83 (1915).

42 At p. 94.
43 78 Ind. App. 450 (1922).
44

At p. 455.

45

King v. Rea, 56 Ind. 1, Outland v. Bowen, 115 Ind. 150.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

the creation by deed of a contingent remainder in fee on a prior
remainder in fee only if limited to take effect during the minority
of the first taker. As is suggested hereafter, however, "contingent remainder" in the statute must be construed to mean "executory interest," and if so construed logically, would not validate a contingent remainder in fee on a prior remainder in fee
by deed, without a trustee; it cannot well mean two opposite
things. But Section 13414, Burns Annotated Indiana Statutes,
1926, which provides that, "A remainder may be limited on a
contingency, which, in case it should happen, will operate to
abridge or determine the precedent estate," has been construed
to allow the creation by deed of a contingent remainder in fee on
46
a prior remainder in fee.
Construing the two statutes together the result probably is
that every legal remainder can take effect as an executory interest, if necessary. But the second part of the "Statute against
Perpetuities," goes to the validity of a supposed contingent remainder in fee on a prior remainder in fee, under the doctrine
against the remote vesting of estates, and not as to its validity
under the law of seisin.
In Edwards v. Bates, 47 there was a devise to W for life, to D
for life, and if at D's death she leaves lawful issue, then to the
lawful issue then living, and if at her death she leaves no lawful
issue, then to X, or her children. D dies after X without children and her husband claims as sole heir on the theory that the
remainder to the children of X was void under Section 13416
Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926. The court holds that the devise to
the children of X was valid, because the children of X took
within lives in being. Clearly the case was one where there was
no suspension of the power of alienation within the ordinary
meaning of that phrase, but there is no discussion on that score
in the opinion. It is definitely assumed by the court that had
the devise over taken effect later than lives in being that it
would have been invalid under the statute. The statute is here
again construed to be directed against remoteness of vesting.
The case of Groub v. Blish,48 is quite unique. Here certain
stockholders of a corporation contracted to transfer stock to a
depository, taking certificates back, the income from the stock to
be used in specified ways for a period of nineten years and eleven
46 McIlhinny v. Mcllhinny, 137 Ind. 411 (1893).
contrary to Finney v. Brandon, supra.
47 79 Ind. App. 578 (1923).
48 (Ind. App.) 152 N. E. 609 (1926).

The result is directly
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months. Some of the stockholders later sought to avoid the
arrangement upon the ground, among others, that it violated
Section 12171, Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926, being an unlawful
suspension of the power of alienation of personal property.
The court held that there was no violation of the statute for
the reason that all of the parties to the arrangement could join
and rescind the contract, the statute applying only where persons were not in being who by joining could convey the entire
estate.
In support of its decision the Court cites two New York
cases, 4 9 and no Indiana cases. The New York Statute specifically provides that the test as to whether or not the absolute power
of alienation is suspended is whether or not there are persons in
being who by joining in a conveyance can convey the entire fee.
The Indiana Statute as regards personal property is not directed
against the suspension of the power of alienation, but is directed
against the suspension of "the absolute ownership of personal
property." It may be that the two phrases mean, or could properly be construed to mean, the same thing; but nowhere in any
of the cases in Indiana is there the slightest discussion of the
difference in this language and that in the statute on real property. In the case in question it is assumed that the statute on
personal property is directed against a restraint on the alienation of personal property, but only if the restraint be absolute.
There was no suspension of the absolute ownership of the stock;
the ownership may have been somewhat divided, but there never
has been any policy against that.
It must be obvious that the real property statute and the personal property statute were only directed, and can only be construed to be, against, 1. an absolute restraint on the alienation,
disposition or use of property for a period of time measured by
anything other than lives in being; 2. the creation of contingent
or executory interests which may not vest within lives in being.
The short answer to the argument advanced in the case in question to the effect that the arrangement violated the statute is
that there was no restraint on anyone's ownership of the property; each was free to sell whatever he had; and there were no
contingent or executory interests created by the instrument
attacked.
The measure suggested by the court, that the problem could
be solved by an answer to the question as to whether or not
there were persons in being who by joining in a conveyance
49 At p. 612.
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could convey the entire estate, would seem to be not an infallible measure and creates a new confusion of the subject. It could,
of course, well happen that a valid estate could be limited to the
unborn children of X who are alive at the death of Z. This
measure if always used would logically invalidate every contingent interest where the contingency went as to who was to
take, other than specified living persons, even although they
were to take during lives in being.
The real theory of the case seems to be that anything short of
the suspension of the absolute power of alienation is not a violation of the statute.
The last case on the subject is that of Swain v. Bowers.50 .In
this case the testator gave all of his property to a trustee to
convert into money, one-half to be held in trust for the children
of the two sons of a deceased husband, said grandchildren to
have an equal share, whether born before or after the death of
the testator, and one-half on similar terms to the children of
certain named brothers and sisters of the testator. The will
provided that the trustee might pay to the beneficiaries any sum
necessary for their education and support and then to pay threefourths of the share to each wnen the child became twenty-one
(21) years of age, the other one-fourth to be held until the final
determination by the trustee that no more children would be
born, and upon said determination, then all of the share of each
to be given to each beneficiary as he reached twenty-one (21).
The will further provided that upon the death of any of the
beneficiaries without issue, or their descendants living, the interest of the deceased beneficiary was to go to the balance of
the class. The will was attacked as being void under Section
12171, Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926. The court held that it was
a gift to a class which vested at the death of the testator and
that, therefore, there was no violation of the statute.
The language of the court indicates quite clearly that the court
thought that the Common Law Rule against Perpetuities was
still law in Indiana and that the statute in question was merely
a statute against restraints on alienation, although practically
all of the cases cited by the court in its decision are New York
cases, where as has been seen above, the New York courts have
construed the New York statute to the effect that the statute
superseded the Common Law Rule against Perpetuities.
GODecided November 15, 1927,
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The court says 5' that the Rule against Perpetuities "applies
only to future estates which are contingent and has no application to vested estates," and, 52 "The Rule against Perpetuities is
satisfied by the vesting of the right to the estate within the limitation of the rule, though the beneficiaries may not then be.
known," and5 3 "Where the general testamentary scheme of the
testator can be carried out without transgressing the Rule
against Perpetuities or the statute with respect to restraint on
alienation, the provisions of the will carrying out such scheme
will be sustained." "As soon as title vests absolutely, suspension of the absolute ownership ceased," citing Illinois cases.
And, 54 "Time of vesting and not time of enjoyment is limited by
the statute."
Immediately following these last statements of law, supported
principally by Illinois decisions, the court then goes on to the
New York rule concerning the test of alienability. "Where there
are living parties who have unitedly the entire right of ownership, the statute has no application,"5 5 "There is no suspension
of the absolute power of alienation if all persons having interest, present or future, can convey a fee simple. If any interest
is inalienable and may remain inalienable for a period longer
than provided by the statute, it is void. The statute is not applicable to any interest that is alienable, though it is a contingent
interest and may remain contingent for a period longer than
that permitted by the statute for the suspension of the absolute
power of alienation." "Each trust in the instant case was in
favor of a class and vested in the members of the class upon the
death of the persons by whose lives the trust was measured."
The court fails to explain how unborn children could join in
conveying. The case is in direct conflict on principle with the
6
case of Phillips v. Heldt.5
. The case holds that the estates being vested estates were valid under the Common Law Rule
against Perpetuities and not within the prohibition of the statute on restraints against alienation. To a greater extent than
the language in any other of the previous cases, the language of
the court in this case indicates that the Common Law Rule
51 At p. 601.
52 At p. 602.
53 At p. 603.
54 At

p. 604.

55 At p. 604, citing Williams v. Montgomery, 198 N. Y. 519, 33 N. E.

57.

-

GO 33 Ind. App. 388 (1904) discussed above.
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against Perpetuities is still law in Indiana and that the personal
property statute against restraints on alienation has had no
effect upon it.
The language of the case, however, is very indefinite and confusing upon this score. (Among other things, emphasis is several times laid on the fact that the interest of the children vested
during lives in being, that is, the lives of their named parents.)
It applies decisions decided under the common law rule against
perpetuities in Illinois,51 and cases decided under the Michigan
statute and statutes similar to it, which have been held not to
be a modified statement of the Common Law Rule against Perpetuities. It also cites cases decided under the New York statutes. As pointed out above, the New York measure of alienability does not permit contingent interests where the contingency goes to the question as to who is to take, except as between specified persons in being, and clearly the rule could not
be successfully applied in the case in question for at the death
of the testator, although the estate vested in a class because
members of the class were then living, persons were not in exfstence at the time who by joining, could convey.
There could be little argument that the will in question offended the Common Law Rule against Perpetuities because even
if the estates were not vested, they would finally vest within lives
in being plus twenty-one years. The decision would seem to indicate that any vested estate does not offend the statute in question when given effect as a statute against restraints on alienaion. As suggested above, the result of the case is directly contrary to Phillips v. Heldt, supra, which must be considered as
overruled by this later decision. It is curious that the court
cites in its opinion only three Indiana cases and those merely
upon fundamental propositions as to the rules of construction of
a will.
If the Common Law Rule against Perpetuities is law in Indiana the case is clearly correctly decided. If the Statute against
Perpetuities limits the Common Law Rule to lives in being, the
opinion is far from satisfactory. The court fails to discuss the
effect of the later clause in the will which provided that if any
child died his share was to go to the survivors. And in fact the
court says, "If there be a direct gift to a legatee, a direction for
payment at the happening of a certain event does not prevent its
vesting, and the personal representative of a legatee dying before the event happened is entitled to receive it at the time the
57

See Easton v. Hall, 154 N. E. 216 (Ill.
1926).
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legacy was directed to be paid to the legatee, had he lived."
Here, of course, the legacy was payable only if the legatee did
live.
As will be seen in the latter portion of this paper, the clause
in question under the older Indiana cases ought doubtless to be
construed to refer to a death during the lifetime of the testator,
but under the more recent Appellate Court cases would doubtless have to be construed to mean a death at any time before distribution, there being sufficient in the language of the will to
indicate that intention.
If it be so construed then there is certainly a contingency both
as to who is ultimately to take the estate and the amount to be
taken. Under the English authorities it would seem that the
will would be construed to give no vested estates.5a Under the
Indiana authorities, however, the estate would certainly have to
be construed to be vested subject to let in after-born children,
and subject to be divested by death without issue before distribution.57b The divesting might occur subsequent to lives in
being. The limitation over to the survivors would be invalid,
and the estate of the one who had died would pass to his heirs,
unless the provisions of the will be construed to be inseparable.57o
The case could well be a test case as to the exact effect of the
"Statute against Perpetuities," but as it stands it is an unsatisfactory decision to the effect that the Common Law Rule
against Perpetuities is still in force in Indiana.
CONCLUSION
What conclusion can be reached as to the law of Indiana
on the Rule against Perpetuities under the statutes under
discussion? As stated at the beginning there is no decision or discussion in the cases as to whether the statutes are directly solely against restraints on alienation as such,
and do not limit the common law doctrine of the Rule against
Perpetuities. But certainly the result of the cases is that the
statutes are equally statutory enactments against restraints on
57aLeake v.Robinson, Ch. 1817, 2 Mer. 363; In re Moseley's Trust, Ch.,
Ct. of App., H. of L., L. R. 11 Eq. 499, 11 Ch. Div. 555, 5 A. C. 714 (1880).
57b Silvers v. Canary, 114 Ind. 129 (1888); Chambers v. Chambers, 139
Ind. 111 (1894); Goodwin v. Goodwin, 48 Ind. 584 (1874); Miller v. Keegan, 14 Ind. 502 (1860); McCoy v. Houck, 180 Ind. 64 (1913). These
cases and others are discussed in the latter part of this paper.
570 See, Tiff. Real Prop. 2d Ed., Vol. 1, Sec. 186.
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alienation, and limitations of the Rule against Perpetuities. The
last case decided, Swain v. Bowers, supra, seems to decide without discussion of the problem involved that at least as far as personal property is concerned the Common Law Rule is still in
force in Indiana. The balance of the cases indicate that the
Common Law Rule is completely superseded by the Statutes.
The fact is, however, that there has been no conscious decision
either way.
In the absence of a clear cut decision on the question it is impossible to say just what the law of Indiana is. It is submitted
here, however, that the only safe course for a lawyer to pursue is
to assume that any contingent or executory interest which may
not vest within lives in being is invalid under both statutes. It
is also submitted that when the question is presented to the
courts they will so decide. There are three reasons for this
conclusion: first, the statutes have for fifty years been referred
to by the courts of Indiana as the "Statutes against Perpetuities;" second, the statutes are admittedly copied from the New
York statute which has now been so construed; third, the statutes have in fact been so enforced in several cases, and those
cases may create a "rule of property."
All of the above, of course, is subject to the proviso in the second half of the statute dealing with real property, which permits
the creation of a contingent remainder in fee upon a prior remainder in fee, to be determined during the minority of the first
taker. If any lawyer has need for such an estate there would
seem to be no reason why the plain language of the statute
should not be given effect. The purpose of the proviso seems to
be to allow one to create an estate "to X for life, remainder in
fee to his children, but provided the children die under the age
of twenty-one, or provided Z dies while said children are under
the age of twenty-one, leaving children, then to the children of
"Z,it being the intention here to create a contingent remainder
in fee within the meaning of Sections 13416 and 13414, Burns'
Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926." To a very limited extent this portion of
the statute admits of the creation of estates valid under the common law rule against perpetuities. There is difficulty in the use
of the words "contingent remainder," but certainly the statute
must be construed to permit what would be an executory interest
under the name of "contingent remainder," as otherwise this
section of the statute would be without force. The first remainder must always be limited to minors and must be a remainder in fee.
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ACCUMULATIONS
At Common Law a direction for accumulation of the income of
property was valid for the period allowed by the Rule against
Perpetuities.58 This led to the passage in England of The Thellusson Act, limiting the period within which a direction for accumulation was valid.59 Section 12172 Burns' Ann. Ind. Stat.
1926 is quite similar to the English Act but applies only to personal property. It allows, 1. an accumulation to commence at
the death of the giver or the execution of the instrument creating the gift, for the benefit of minors, to terminate on the expiration of minority; 2. an accumulation to commence within
lives in being and during the minority of the beneficiary, to terminate at the expiration of the minority; 3. if the accumulation
is directed to continue beyond minority it is void only as to the
period beyond minority.
Under this statute it has been held that an accumulation to
unborn grandchildren until twenty-one was void, 60 and that an
accumulation not limited to minority is void ;61 and that an accumulation during minority, not limited to persons in being at
the death of the testator, or to begin during lives in being, is
void. 2 A partial accumulation after payments for the support
6
of minors, during minority, is not invalid. 3
6
4
In the case of Groub v. Blish, discussed above, where stock
was transferred to a depository and certificates issued for the
stock, the dividends from the stock to be partially accumulated
for nineteen years and eleven months, it was argued that the
provision for accumulation was invalid under the statute in
question. The Court held that the statute had no application,
being directed against the accumulation of funds for the benefit
of unborn generations, and not against an accumulation of. funds
for the payment of debts, or other business purposes.
With the exception of the unusual circumstances of the case
last cited the statute has been enforced in its literal sense. It is
unambiguous, and there should be little difficulty in drafting an
instrument which will not offend the provisions of the statute
Thellusson v. Woodford, H. of L. 1805, 11 Ves. 112.
59 Tiff. Real Property, 2d Ed., Vol. 1, p. 620.
60 Dyson v. Repp, 29 Ind. 482 (1868)
61 Porterv. Union Trust Co., 182 Ind. 637 (1914).
62 Shriver v. Montgomery, 181 Ind. 108 (1913).
63 Swain v. Bowers, (Ind. App.) 158 N. E. 598 (1927).
64 (Ind. App.) 152 N. E. 609 (1926).
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against accumulations. As far as accumulations from real property are concerned they are not limited by the statute and are
either governed by the "Statute against Perpetuities," or the
Rule against Perpetuities. For the same reasons advanced above
in the conclusion as to the effect of the "Statute against Perpetuities" it is submitted that accumulations from real estate must
be limited to lives in being.
CHARITIES
A great part of the confusion of the subject of the Rule
against Perpetuities and Restraints on Alienation, arose out of
the cases dealing with charitable trusts. It was apparent that a
permanent gift to charity took the property out of circulation, so
to speak, indefinitely. There was a restraint on alienation, in
one sense of the word, for the reason that the beneficiaries being
uncertain, there could be no conveyance.
There was for a while confusion as to whether the Rule against
Perpetuities was a rule against the remoteness of vesting of estates, or a rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation,
and there was considerable discussion as to whether the Rule
against Perpetuities applied to charitable gifts. It was decided
that there was not an unreasonable restraint on alienation, and
that in fact public policy favored such a restraint as was necessarily a part of a charitable gift. And it is now quite definitely
settled that the Rule or Statute against Perpetuities, as properly
understood as a prohibition against the remote vesting of estates, does apply to charitable gifts. The gift must vest within
the time allowed, but having so vested it is valid, although it
may last forever.The interesting question is whether or not after a vested charitable gift, there may be limited a valid gift over to another charity, without regard to the Rule or Statute against Perpetuities.
If the gift must admittedly vest in the first instance within the
time allowed by the rule, then logically the second gift would fail
unless properly limited in time. The law seems to be settled in
6
Indiana by the case of Herron v. Stanton,6 that a gift over to a
second charity is valid even although it may vest beyond lives
Tiff. Real Prop. 2d Ed., Vol. 1, p. 617; Reasoner v. Herman, 191 Ind.
at p. 652; Dykeman v. Jenkins, 179 Ind. 549 (1913) at p. 563;
(1921),
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City of Richmond v. Davis, 103 Ind. 449 (1885); Ba-r v. Geary, 82 Ind.
App. 5 (1924).
66 79 Ind. App. 683 (1920).
65
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exception to the rule, but is the
in being. This is an admitted
67
generally recognized law.

SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS
As to how far a restraint is good, which attempts to create
an interest in a beneficiary which is not subject to execution for
the payment of his debts, has not been definitely decided by the
Indiana courts, although so-called spendthrift trusts are quite
8
generally recognized as valid in the United States.

It will be

noted that Mr. Tiffany cites the case of MllcCoy v. Houck,O as
deciding that a spendthrift trust is good. But it is submitted that
the case merely recognizes the general validity of such an arrangement, and does not decide the question. The question was
whether the beneficiary had taken a life estate or something
more, and it was decided that he took merely a life estate.
The case of Langdon v. Ingram,70 does hold that a spendthrift
trust during minority and the life of the mother of certain children was valid, and it is assumed in the case of Thompson v.
Murphy,71 that a spendthrift trust was good in Indiana, the
court in the last case holding however, that in that case no such
trust was in fact attempted to be created.
In view of the language of these three decisions and the general law on the subject, it is safe to assume that a spendthrift
trust is good in Indiana.
LIVES IN BEING
There is but one case in Indiana discussing the question as to
whether or not a child who is en ventre sa mere is a life in being
within the meaning of the rule or statute, and it is said in that
case that it is.72 In one other case such a child has been held to
be a child in being so as to take a present estate on the death of
the testator. 73 Such a child is a life in being so that it takes
under a deed,74 and also so that it inherits under the Indiana
Statute of Descent. 7
67 Tiff. Real prop. 2d Ed., Vol. 1, p. 618.
6s Tiff. Real Prop. 2 Ed., Vol III, p. 2319, et seq.
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180 Ind. 634 (1913).
70 28 Ind. 360 (1867).
7110 Ind. App. 464 (1894).
72 Swain v. Bowers, (Ind. App.) 158 N. E. 598 (1927).
73 Biggs v. MeCarty, 86 Ind. 352 (1882).
74 King v. Rea, 56 Ind. 1 (1877).
75 Cox v. Matthews, 17 Ind. 367 (1861).
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FUTURE LEASEHOLD ESTATES
There are no cases discussing the question as to whether or
not a lease to begin in the future if it is not measured by lives
in being is good under the statute. Mr. Tiffany regards the common law as unsettled on that question, and presents a forcible
argument to the effect that such an interest is as invalid as a fee
simple sought to be created to vest beyond the time allowed under the rule. 76 If Mr. Tiffany's reasoning is correct then a lease

'in Indiana for a term of years to begin in the future, at any time
not measured by lives in being, would be invalid under the
statute.
CONTINGENT REMAINDERS
There are no cases in Indiana which discuss the question as to
whether this "statute against perpetuities" applies to contingent
remainders. If there is a contingent remainder limited after an
estate for life, for example, where the contingency named may
not occur within the time allowed, still the contingent remainder
is good, for the reason that in order to vest at all it must vest at
the termination of the estate for life upon which it is limited, or
be cut off by the vesting in possession of the reversion. The
effect of the law is to really limit the contingent remainder as
follows: "contingent remainder to unborn child of B at 22, if he
arrives at the age of twenty-two during the lifetime of the life
tenant."'77
OPTIONS
The more important question is, does the "statute against perpetuities" apply to options? If so all options in order to be
valid must be limited to take effect, not within a number of
years, but within lives in being. In England and in a good
many states in this country it has been held that an option to
purchase real estate not measured by lives in being plus twentyone years, was invalid under the Rule against Perpetuities. 78
On the other hand, in Minnesota and other states where the New
York Statute has been copied, and which provides that the test
of inalienability must be whether or not there are lives in being
who by joining can convey, it has been held that an option is not
7 6 Tiff. Real Prop. 2d E d., Vol. 1, p. 604.

Tiff. Real Prop. 2d Ed., Vol. 1, p. 605.
London and Southwestern R. Co. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 421, 51 L. J. Ch.
N. S. 530, 46 L. T. N. S. 449; Winsor v. Mills, 157 Mass. 362, 32 N. E. 352,
and cases cited beginning at page 904, L. R. A. 1917 D.
77
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invalid for the reason that the owner of the option can release
it, or join with the owner of the land and convey a fee. 79
Although as seen in the discussion of the Indiana cases above
on two occasions the Appellate Court has applied the New York
measure of alienability, it is apparent that it is far from settled
in Indiana just whether the statute is directed against restraints
on alienability, remoteness of vesting, or both. If it were only
the first then the Common Law Rule against Perpetuities is still
law in Indiana. In that event an option could be limited up to
twenty-one years. If the statute completely supersedes the common law, and if it is aimed at remote vesting of estates, as it
certainly has been construed to be, without regard to the alienability of the entire fee, then any option not limited to be exercised within lives in being is invalid. But having applied the
New York test as to alienability in the last two cases decided, the
Indiana Courts may apply it to an option, and thus eliminate
the question.
The effect of the "Statute against Perpetuities" in connection
with the creation of future estates by a power has received no
attention by the Indiana Courts so far. The problems and the
results are quite similar to those in connection with options.
(To Be Continued)
Mineral Land Inv. Co. v. Bishop Iron Co., 134 Minn. 412, 159 N. W.
966, L. R. A. 1917 D 900, and cases cited in note beginning at page 904.
Tiff. Real Prop. 2d Ed., Vol. 1, p. 607, and cases there cited.
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